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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
Cite as: Bradshaw v. City Style, Inc., 203 F.4th 1 (14th Cir. 2001)1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS






I Subsequent references to the record should be cited as 203 F.4th 1 (14th
Cir. 2001) and as dictated by the sequential pagination in this typewritten opinion.
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Majority opinion delivered by BRODERICK, C.J., with whom
STEVENS, J., joins.
STAR, J., filed a dissenting opinion:
We address two issues on this appeal. The first is whether a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") 2 may be based entirely on a disparate impact analysis.
The second is whether Carrie S. Bradshaw established that she is
substantially limited in the major life activity of working under Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").3 For the
following reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment for City Style and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 5, 2000, Bradshaw filed a discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
against City Style, Inc. ("City Style"). Bradshaw asserted violations
under the ADEA and the ADA based on age and disability. The
EEOC investigated the charge without making a determination and
issued a notice of right to sue letter. Bradshaw then filed suit in the
United States District Court of the Southern District of Wagner,
asserting two counts of employment discrimination. Count one of
the complaint alleged a violation of the ADEA. Count two alleged
a violation of the ADA. At the conclusion of discovery, the district
court, in an oral opinion, granted City Style's motion for summary
judgment on both counts.
II. FACTS
The facts, drawn from the pleadings and the parties' stipula-
tions, are not in dispute.
City Style, a company incorporated in the State of Wagner,
publishes Fashion and the City, a local newspaper that centers on
the fashion, entertainment, and politics of Martini City. Martini
City is the only major city located in the State of Wagner; the near-
est city is approximately 180 miles away. In the fall of 1981, when it
was founded by Miranda Hobbes and Charlotte York, Fashion and
2 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2002).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2002).
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the City brought free-form, high-spirited, and passionate journalism
into the public discourse. From its founding until 1989, City Style
maintained a modest circulation and advertising base, depending on
the season. As Martini City's first newsweekly, Fashion and the City
preserved a tradition of no-holds barred reporting and criticism, in-
tertwined with the comedy and spunk of the City.
In May 1989, Mr. Big, a renowned businessman, came to Mar-
tini City from New York City to purchase a publishing company.
He acquired City Style because of its increasing popularity and po-
tential for growth. Mr. Big became the sole owner and Chief Execu-
tive Officer of City Style. Between 1989 and 1998, City Style
expanded its news coverage, circulation, and advertising base. By
the end of 1998, City Style employed 125 people and returned a
profit of $3.3 million for the fiscal year.
In 1999, the advertising market hit a downturn. At the same
time, a competing weekly newspaper, The Sopranos Edition, lo-
cated 200 miles away, entered the market and diverted a significant
number of advertisers from City Style. By the middle of 1999, Mr.
Big determined that City Style was operating beyond its budget. He
decided to change City Style's focus to attract a smaller, more elite
audience. Mr. Big determined that a reduction in force ("RIF") was
necessary to implement that goal. Mr. Big set a target reduction in
non-management labor costs at $2.5 million per year. In his instruc-
tions to his senior management staff, Mr. Big implemented a policy
in which employees whose salaries over $100,000 annually, or those
with unsatisfactory work performance evaluations, were the first
employees considered for layoff.4
Appellant, Bradshaw, age fifty-one, was laid off because of
City Style's RIF. Bradshaw was a features reporter 5 for City Style.
As a features reporter, she was required to be "on the scene" to
report fashion violations and other breaking news. To uphold Fash-
ion and the City's tradition of being the first to report the newest
"do's and don't's," Bradshaw's work day began at 6:00 a.m. Brad-
shaw also typically worked late at night covering evening social
events, parties, award ceremonies, and other socialite engagements.
Bradshaw also frequented Martini City's trendiest night spots to re-
port on who was arriving with whom and what they were wearing.
4 See Appendix A.
5 As a features reporter, Bradshaw was exempt from overtime pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2002).
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Bradshaw suffered a seizure in June 1999. Dr. Trey MacDou-
gal, a neurologist, diagnosed her as suffering from epilepsy. Epi-
lepsy is a neurological condition that causes unprovoked seizures.
After her diagnosis, Bradshaw began taking Dilantin, a medication
that suppresses seizures by controlling rapidly firing neuronal dis-
charges. Dilantin's side effects include insomnia and drowsiness.
Absent this medication, Bradshaw risks suffering multiple,
debilitating seizures and possible death. Although other medica-
tions to control seizures were available, Dr. MacDougal determined
that Dilantin was the safest medication for Bradshaw because it
would have the fewest harmful side effects.
Initially, Bradshaw attempted to maintain her prior work
hours. Within three months of suffering from the side effects of the
medication, however, Bradshaw realized that she could not keep
her rigorous schedule. On September 15, 1999, Bradshaw met with
her supervisor, Ms. Brady, and requested that City Style permit her
to begin work at noon. Bradshaw argued that her nighttime work
was more critical to her column than her early morning work. Ms.
Brady advised Bradshaw to make the request directly to Mr. Big.
Later that day, Bradshaw informed Mr. Big of her request. She told
Mr. Big that the side effects of her medication were greatest in the
morning. Bradshaw promised that her column would not suffer and
that she would work additional evening hours to make up any lost
time. Before Mr. Big gave Bradshaw an answer, Bradshaw received
notice that City Style had terminated her employment as part of the
RIF.
On October 5, 1999, Mr. Big announced the layoff of twenty-
five employees, effective immediately. The RIF resulted in the ter-
mination of five employees under the age of forty, of whom three
earned over $100,000 annually and of whom two had records of
poor job performance. In addition, twenty employees over the age
of forty were terminated, of whom seventeen earned over $100,000
annually and of whom three had records of poor job performance.
Before the RIF, the average age of City Style's employees was
thirty-seven. After the RIF, the average age was thirty-four. Before
the RIF, the average salary of the non-management employees was
$77,455. After the RIF, the average salary was $64,199.
On January 5, 2000, Bradshaw filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC alleging that City Style unjustly terminated her and
other similarly situated individuals based on their age. Bradshaw
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claimed that City Style implemented a policy that had an adverse
impact on employees over the age of forty. In addition, Bradshaw
alleged that City Style discharged her because she is a disabled indi-
vidual substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
In her deposition, Bradshaw testified that she had worked for
City Style for sixteen years. Bradshaw is a graduate of Catrall Uni-
versity Journalism School; one of the country's best. Bradshaw as-
serts that she was already a respected fashion reporter when she
began her career with City Style. During her employment at City
Style, Bradshaw's salary and bonuses increased, as did the respect
she received from her peers in the fashion industry. Indeed, Brad-
shaw's column was one of the most read features in Fashion and the
City.
Bradshaw also testified that she heard rumors that Mr. Big
wanted to discharge twenty-five employees. Bradshaw testified that
she was aware that five individuals who earned over $100,000 would
be unaffected by the RIF because thirty employees earned over
$100,000. Bradshaw testified that she then approached Mr. Big on
or about September 20, 1999. At that time, Bradshaw relayed that
she hoped that her request for the accommodation would not affect
Mr. Big's decision regarding her employment status. Bradshaw
stated that Mr. Big replied that he had to "factor all risks and con-
siderations in making any determination."
Bradshaw further testified that upon her termination she ap-
plied for numerous jobs in the journalism field. Due to her inability
to begin work before noon, however, Bradshaw was unable to find
comparable work in the Martini City area.
At the conclusion of discovery, City Style moved for summary
judgment. The district court considered the briefs from both parties
and, after oral argument, issued a decision from the bench granting
summary judgment. The district court judge dismissed the ADEA
claim based on precedent holding that a disparate impact theory is
not cognizable under the ADEA. The judge dismissed the ADA
claim because Bradshaw was not a qualified person with a disability
under the ADA.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This case concerns age and disability discrimination under the
ADEA and the ADA. We reverse the district court's grant of sum-
728 [Vol. XlX
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mary judgment for City Style and remand for proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue
of material fact. 6 The moving party bears the initial burden of show-
ing, by reference to materials in the record, that no genuine issues
of material fact need be decided at trial.7 The moving party may
discharge this burden by exposing an absence of evidence to sup-
port the nonmoving party's case.
8
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine
whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Bradshaw,
the nonmoving party, reveals any genuine issue of material fact and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 9
B. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
A disparate impact claim is viable under the ADEA. Thus, the
district court improvidently granted summary judgment. Bradshaw
alleges that she was discriminated against because City Style's RIF
had a disparate impact on employees over the age of forty. Brad-
shaw argues that by targeting employees with the highest salaries,
City Style implemented a policy that resulted in terminating a dis-
proportionate number of employees over the age of forty.
Because Bradshaw relies solely on the disparate impact theory
of discrimination, the first issue before this Court is whether that
claim is cognizable under the ADEA. Given that this is a case of
first impression before this Court, we look to other jurisdictions for
guidance. For the reasons set forth below, we follow the jurisdic-
tions that recognize a disparate impact claim.
The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer ...to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual ...because of such individual's age." 10 A
successful disparate impact claim relies on a facially neutral em-
ployment practice or policy, not otherwise justified by a business
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
7 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320.
8 Id. at 325.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
10 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
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necessity, which has an adverse impact on a protected class." Dis-
parate impact claims have traditionally been available to Title VII
claimants.12 Congress created Title VII to achieve broad-based
equality of employment opportunities. Consequently, disparate im-
pact claims, which focus on discrimination as an end-result rather
than as a cause, comport with what Congress was trying to
accomplish. 13
The ADEA's prohibitions broadly define discrimination by
tracking the language of Title VII.14 As such, the ADEA, like Title
VII, permits proof of discrimination using the theory of disparate
impact.
In the case before us, City Style implemented a RIF that af-
fected employees with higher salary ranges. As a result, older em-
ployees and those with the most years of service were terminated
because, in general, salaries correlate with experience and job ten-
ure. Bradshaw has demonstrated a statistical disparity between the
ages of the laid-off employees and the ages of the retained employ-
ees. We therefore find genuine issues of material fact concerning
the claim of disparate impact and accordingly reverse the grant of
summary judgment.
C. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Bradshaw's physical impairment substantially limits her in the
major life activity of working. The ADA provides that "no covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... dis-
charge of employees .... -15 A claimant must be a qualified
individual with a disability to be within the class of individuals the
ADA protects.
A qualified individual with a disability is "an individual with a
disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." 16 The ADA defines a disability as
11 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)
12 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
13 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 437 (1971) (finding that high
school diploma requirement had an adverse impact on minority employees).
14 Hazen, 507 U.S. at 604; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); Geller
v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
16 Id. § 12111(8).
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"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.'
17
To determine whether an individual is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, this Court must first determine whether the
condition in question constitutes a physical or mental impairment.
Epilepsy is defined as a "disorder of the nervous system, usually
characterized by fits of convulsions that end with loss of conscious-
ness."' 18 Bradshaw's diagnosis as an epileptic qualifies her as having
a physical impairment for the purpose of defining a disability under
the ADA. Further, both parties stipulate that epilepsy is a physical
impairment.
Next, this Court must determine whether Bradshaw's epilepsy
substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. The Su-
preme Court has determined that major life activities refer to those
activities of central importance to most people's daily lives. 19 The
EEOC regulations identify major life activities as "functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
'20
Several circuit courts have also concluded that working falls
within the category of major life activities.2 ' We are persuaded by
the circuits' reasoning and the EEOC's guidance. As such, we join
the majority of the circuits and find that working is a major life
activity.
Bradshaw contends that her epilepsy limits her in the major life
activity of working because the side effects of her medication im-
pedes on her ability to work. However, Bradshaw's seizures are
substantially controlled by her medication, which in some circum-
stances would render her not impaired at all for purposes of ADA
analysis.2 2 Nonetheless, the very medication that Bradshaw must
17 Id. § 12102(2).
18 5 Oxford English Dictionary 332 (2d ed. 1989).
19 See Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002).
20 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20).
21 See, e.g., Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that restaurant manager was substantially limited in ability to work because of
injuries from car accident); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 172 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that former warehouse worker established that carpel tunnel syndrome
substantially limited ability to work).
22 See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (holding that
disability under ADA must be determined with reference to corrective measures).
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take to control her epilepsy has potentially debilitating side effects.
The effects of Bradshaw's medication are the basis for her impair-
ment as much as the underlying epilepsy.23
The final step in determining whether an individual is disabled
is to determine if the plaintiff's impairment results in a substantial
limitation on a major life activity. The EEOC provides several fac-
tors in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a
major life activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment;
(2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3)
the permanent or long-term impact or the expected permanent or
long-term impact resulting from the impairment.2 4
The Supreme Court has held that when the major life activity
under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase "sub-
stantially limits requires ... that plaintiffs allege that they are una-
ble to work in a broad class of jobs. '25 To be substantially limited in
the major life activity of working, a person must be precluded from
more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of
choice. 26 Even if a job uses an individual's skills, but no unique tal-
ents, then the individual is not precluded from performing in a sub-
stantial class of jobs.27 Similarly, if different types of jobs are
available, the individual is not precluded from a broad range of
jobs.
The EEOC has identified several factors that courts should
consider when determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. These factors include
the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access
and "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills, or abilities, within the geographical area, from which
the individual is also disqualified. ' 28
We are persuaded that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that City Style discriminated against Bradshaw because of her im-
pairment. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Bradshaw's
disability significantly restricted her ability to perform the major
life activity of working. We are further persuaded that genuine is-
23 See id. at 492 (holding that side effects of medication may be taken into
account in ADA analysis).
24 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2).
25 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491; Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190
26 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 190.
27 Id.
28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)(B).
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sues of material fact exist about whether Bradshaw's epilepsy and
the medication's side effects significantly interfered with her ability
to work. Bradshaw's discharge came precipitously after her request
for accommodation. This raises questions from which inferences
could be drawn in Bradshaw's favor. Therefore, we find that the
district court improvidently granted summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
STAR J., dissenting:
I disagree with the majority on both issues. Thus, I dissent.
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
The district court correctly granted City Style's motion for
summary judgment. City Style did not discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against Bradshaw or any other similarly situated individu-
als with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of the individuals' ages.
The majority's interpretation of the ADEA in relation to Title
VII is an abhorrent deviation from reasoned logic. In 1991, Con-
gress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to outline
the parties' respective burdens of proof in cases involving an "em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'29 However, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 made no mention of disparate impact based on
age and did not similarly amend the ADEA. Therefore, Congress
did not intend to allow disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
Although a disparate impact theory in Title VII cases effectuates
the overall goals of the Civil Rights Act, the same is not true for the
ADEA.
Moreover, the majority's decision cannot be reconciled with
the Supreme Court's ruling in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.30 The
Court in Hazen Paper did not decide whether a disparate impact
claim is viable under the ADEA. However, Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, categorically declared that "disparate
treatment" was distinct from disparate impact under the ADEA.31
The Court articulated that disparate treatment, rather than dispa-
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
30 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
31 Id. at 607.
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rate impact, "captures the essence of what Congress sought to pro-
hibit in the ADEA. ''32
City Style implemented a policy that made no reference to age;
it simply terminated employees based on budgetary reasons-a dif-
ferentiation based on a reasonable factor other than age. Even if
City Style's neutral policy had an adverse effect on employees over
forty, a violation of the ADEA may not be established using a dis-
parate impact theory of employment discrimination. Accordingly,
the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper.
B. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The district court was also correct in granting City Style's mo-
tion for summary judgment under the ADA claim. Bradshaw
presents no genuine issues of material fact because she is not a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Bradshaw
fails to demonstrate that City Style discriminated against her based
on her disability. Working is not a major life activity accepted
within the meaning of the ADA.33
Even assuming that working is a major life activity, Bradshaw
has submitted no evidence to place in issue her inability to work in
a "broad range of jobs," rather than simply a specific job.34 The
Supreme Court has specified that the terms of the ADA need to be
interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for a person to
qualify as disabled under the ADA.35 Further, the ADA requires
individuals to prove a disability by offering evidence that their im-
pairment substantial limits a major life activity. 36
The position of features reporter is a single, particular job, and
a limitation on a single, particular job cannot constitute a substan-
tial limitation on the major life activity of working. By way of com-
parison, courts have held that a disability that precludes piloting an
32 Id. at 608.
33 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (noting "conceptual difficulty" of considering
working as a major life activity when underlying question is whether one is ex-
cluded from working because of an impairment).
34 See id. at 190 (quoting Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491
(1999)).
35 See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
36 Id.; see also Doren v. Battle Creek Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding that pediatric nurse's impairment prevented performing nursing du-
ties on adult floor but that plaintiff presented no evidence concerning number of
pediatric nursing jobs from which she was excluded).
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airplane does not substantially impair working because the relevant
class of jobs includes ground trainer, flight instructor, and an airline
management or administrative employee.3 7 Bradshaw simply as-
serts that she could not perform the early morning responsibilities
of a field reporter due to the side effects of her medication. Surely,
a journalist of Bradshaw's stature and experience could find em-
ployment in the field of journalism in Martini City or elsewhere.
As a matter of law, Bradshaw is unable to place at issue
whether she is substantially limited in both a class of jobs and a
broad range of jobs in various classes in the Martini City metropoli-
tan area. The record is devoid of evidence that Bradshaw is limited
in her ability to perform other reporting jobs, much less all jobs that
require an early morning shift. Therefore, summary judgment is
appropriate.
I dissent.
37 See Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 1998);
see also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
firefighter's inability to work is not substantial limitation on major life activity of
working because fire-fighting does not constitute "class of jobs").
20031 735
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The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit is hereby granted so that this
Court may hear and consider the following issues:
1. Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
provides a cause of action based solely on a disparate impact
analysis and whether Respondent has satisfied the requirements
for such a claim for purposes of surviving summary judgment.
2. Whether "working" is a "major life activity" under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and whether Respon-
dent has satisfied, for purposes of surviving summary judgment,
the requirements for an ADA claim based on a substantial im-







Martini City, Wagner 10013
Tel: (212) 867-5309 / Fax: (212) 867-6969
MEMORANDUM
TO: Senior Management Staff
FROM: Mr. Big
DATE: September 15, 1999
RE: Decision to Downsize
All employees are considered valuable and indispensable at City
Style. However, due to budgetary constraints, a reduction in force is
necessary for the continued success of City Style.
The non-management labor budget must be reduced by at least $2.5
million. Thus, approximately 25 employees will be terminated
based on their current salaries. Please give me a list of the 30 indi-
viduals whose current salaries and benefit packages exceed
$100,000 annually, along with their past 6 performance evaluations.
Of the highest paid staff members, those with poor work histories
will be laid off first. The remaining reductions will be based on sal-
ary, save the best performers.
I believe that this decision will best effectuate the goal of operating
City Style efficiently. The RIF will take place on October 5, 1999.
//MB
20031 737

